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Abstract
As an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium, evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory and has at-
tracted growing interest. An ESS can be either a pure strategy or a mixed
strategy. Even though the randomness is allowed in mixed strategy, the se-
lection probability of pure strategy in a mixed strategy may fluctuate due to
the impact of many factors. The fluctuation can lead to more uncertainty.
In this paper, such uncertainty involved in mixed strategy has been further
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taken into consideration: a belief strategy is proposed in terms of Dempster-
Shafer evidence theory. Furthermore, based on the proposed belief strategy,
a belief-based ESS has been developed. The belief strategy and belief-based
ESS can reduce to the mixed strategy and mixed ESS, which provide more
realistic and powerful tools to describe interactions among agents.
Keywords: Evolutionarily stable strategy, Evolutionary game, Mixed
strategy, Dempster-Shafer evidence theory, Belief function
1. Introduction
Game theory [1, 2] provides an effective mathematical framework to ex-
plain and study the interactions among individuals. In many situations, the
preferences, aims, and goals of participating individuals are potentially in
conflict [3]. A canonical example is the prisoner’s dilemma game [4], which ex-
hibits an apparent social dilemma that human cooperation disappears when
there exists a conflict between individual and collective rationality. Due to its
significant advantages of depicting the essence underlying many phenomena
in nature and society, game theory has been widely used in scientific disci-
plines from economics, psychology to biology, as well as operational research
and political science.
Recently, with the ample introduction of temporal dynamics and spatial
topology, traditional theory has been elevated to a new flat: evolutionary
game theory [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], which provides a paradigmatic
framework to study the evolution of cooperation within population dynam-
ics [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Along this research line, the mechanisms of
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promoting the emergence of cooperative behaviors have been greatly pro-
posed [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. Typical examples
include the the mobility of players [34, 35, 36, 37, 38], heterogeneous activity
[39, 40], spatial structured population [41, 42, 43, 44, 45], and coevolutionary
selection of dynamical rules [46, 47], to name but a few. In spite of plen-
tiful achievements, a basic conception, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS),
which was first proposed by Smith and Price [7] and further explained in
[8, 48], always attracts the firm attention from theoretical and experimental
viewpoints [49, 50, 51, 18, 52, 53]. An ESS, an equilibrium refinement of the
Nash equilibrium [54], can be regarded as a solution of one specific game,
which is self enforcing and where no player can gain benefit by unilaterally
deviating from it. At variance with Nash equilibrium, ESS is evolutionarily
stable, and it can be either pure or mixed. Previous study [8] demonstrated
that a game with two pure strategies always has an ESS, despite it is either
a pure ESS or a mixed ESS in a infinite population.
The mixed strategy usually reflects the randomness of strategies. For
example, in a given game with two pure strategies, these two pure strategies
can be represented by s1, s2. In this line, the mixed strategy can be expressed
as I = Ps1 + (1 − P )s2, where P determines the probability of strategy s1
to be selected and takes a value within the interval [0, 1]. However, due
to the impact of many factors, the selection probability of pure strategy
keeps fluctuating in a range [P−, P+] rather than being constant. While this
disturbance can be caused by environmental noise, agent’s rationality degree
and other factors, which gives rise to more uncertainty than that of mixed
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strategy.
Aiming to represent the uncertainty, one novel strategy, belief strategy,
is proposed in this paper. Interestingly, the belief strategy is based upon
the Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [55, 56], which is a tool of express-
ing uncertainty and exploring questions under the uncertain environment
[57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64]. Then, the proposed belief strategy is used
to extend the ESS, namely, the belief strategy is a generalization of mixed
strategy and the belief-based ESS is a generalization of mixed ESS. This
setup provides more realistic and powerful frameworks to describe interac-
tions among agents. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
We will first describe the Hawk-Dove game, evolutionarily stable strategy,
and Dempster-Shafer evidence theory; subsequently, we will present the pro-
posed belief strategy and belief-based ESS; and finally we will summarize our
conclusions.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Hawk-Dove game and evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
Hawk-Dove game [7, 8, 17] is a simple, paradigmatic model to simulate
the competition between animals. Assume there is a population of animals,
in which each individual aggressiveness is different during the interaction
with others. Accordingly, their behaviors can be divided into two types: the
aggressive type and the cooperative type. The aggressive type corresponds
to strategy “Hawk” (H), the cooperative type is associated with strategy
“Dove” (D). Within each interaction, two animals meet and compete for a
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resource V (V > 0). When two Hawks meet, they will fight so that both of
them have the opportunity to get (V −C)/2, where C is the cost of injury in
the fight. When two Doves meet, they will share the resource, which means
each individual obtains V/2. If, however, a Hawk meets a Dove, the former
will fight and the latter can only escape. As a result, the Hawk obtains the
entire resource without any cost of injury, the Dove is left with nothing. In
this sense, The payoff matrix of Hawk-Dove game is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The payoff matrix of Hawk-Dove game
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game
theory. According to its definition [7], in a given environment an ESS is such
a strategy that can not be invaded by any other alternative strategy which is
initially rare. The condition required by an ESS can be formulated as [8, 48]:
E(S, S) > E(T, S), (1)
or
E(S, S) = E(T, S), and E(S, T ) > E(T, T ), (2)
for all T 6= S, where strategy S is an ESS, T is an alternative strategy, and
E(T, S) is the payoff of strategy T playing against strategy S.
5
The conditions given in above equations (namely, Eqs.(1) and (2)) are on
the basis of these assumptions including infinite population, asexual inheri-
tance, complete mixing, pairwise and symmetric contests. If the evolutionar-
ily stable strategy (ESS) S is a pure strategy, S is called a pure ESS. On the
contrary, once S is a mixed strategy, S becomes the so-called mixed ESS. In
[8], it has been proven that a game with two pure strategies always has an
ESS (pure ESS or mixed ESS). Take the Hawk-Dove game as an example. In
that game, pure strategy H is an ESS if V > C because E(H,H) > E(D,H).
Conversely, if V < C, the ESS of Hawk-Dove game is a mixed strategy.
While among the mixed ESS, the Bishop-Canning theorem [65] can pro-
vide great help. Herein, a statement given by Smith [8] is directly adopted
to display the Bishop-Canning theorem.
Bishop-Canning theorem: If I is a mixed ESS with support a, b, c,
· · · , then
E(a, I) = E(b, I) = · · · = E(I, I), (3)
where a, b, c · · · are said to be the “support” of I if these pure strategies are
played with non-zero probability in the mixed strategy.
Based on this theorem, the mixed ESS of Hawk-Dove game, denoted by
I = PH +(1−P )D, where P is the probability choosing strategy H , can be
expressed as
E(H, I) = E(D, I). (4)
Extending Eq.(4), we get
PE(H,H) + (1− P )E(H,D) = PE(D,H) + (1− P )E(D,D), (5)
6
P ×
V − C
2
+ (1− P )× V = P × 0 + (1− P )×
V
2
, (6)
namely,
P =
V
C
. (7)
Hence, the mixed ESS is I = V
C
H + (1 − V
C
)D. It is easy to verify that the
condition displayed in Eq.(2) has been meet in I. The mixed strategy I is
stable against invasion.
2.2. Dempster-Shafer evidence theory
Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [55, 56], also called Dempster-Shafer
theory or evidence theory, has been first proposed by Dempster [55] and
then developed by Shafer [56]. This theory needs weaker conditions than the
Bayesian theory of probability, so it is often regarded as an extension of the
Bayesian theory. As a theory of reasoning under the uncertain environment,
Dempster-Shafer theory has an advantage of directly expressing the “uncer-
tainty” by assigning the probability to the subsets of the set composed of
multiple objects, rather than to each of the individual objects. The prob-
ability assigned to each subset is limited by a lower bound and an upper
bound, which respectively measure the total belief and the total plausibility
for the objects in the subset. For the simplicity of explanation, a few basic
concepts are introduced as follows.
Let Ω be a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events,
indicated by
Ω = {θ1, θ2, · · · , θi, · · · , θN}, (8)
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where the set Ω is called a frame of discernment. The power set of Ω is
indicated by 2Ω, namely
2Ω = {∅, {θ1}, · · · , {θN}, {θ1, θ2}, · · · , {θ1, θ2, · · · , θi}, · · · ,Ω}. (9)
The elements of 2Ω or subset of Ω are called propositions. For a frame of
discernment Ω = {θ1, θ2, · · · , θN}, a mass function is a mapping m from 2
Ω
to [0, 1], formally defined by:
m : 2Ω → [0, 1], (10)
which satisfies the following condition:
m(∅) = 0 and
∑
A∈2Ω
m(A) = 1, (11)
where a mass function is also called a belief function or a basic probability
assignment (BPA). The assigned basic probability number m(A) measures
the belief being exactly assigned to proposition A and represents how strongly
the evidence supports A.
Given a belief function m, we can calculate the associated belief measure
and plausibility measure, indicated by Bel function and P l function, respec-
tively. For a proposition A ⊆ Ω, the belief function Bel : 2Ω → [0, 1] is
defined as
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B). (12)
The plausibility function P l : 2Ω → [0, 1] is defined as
P l(A) = 1− Bel(A¯) =
∑
B∩A 6=∅
m(B), (13)
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where A¯ = Ω − A. Obviously, if P l(A) ≥ Bel(A), Bel and P l are the
lower limit function and upper limit function of the probability to which
proposition A is supported, respectively. According to Shafer’s explanation
[56], the difference between the belief and the plausibility of a proposition
A expresses the ignorance of the assessment for the proposition A. The
uncertainty expressed by belief and plausibility is shown in Figure 2.
0 1
Min belief level of A Max belief level of A
1
Pl(A)
Bel(A) The level of ignorance in A 1-Pl(A)
Figure 2: The uncertainty expressed by belief and plausibility
3. Proposed belief-based evolutionarily stable strategy
In this section, firstly, a belief strategy is proposed based on Dempster-
Shafer evidence theory, which extends the concept of mixed strategy. Sec-
ondly, in terms of the proposed belief strategy, a belief-based ESS is devel-
oped.
3.1. Belief strategy
As above mentioned, in game theory the strategies can be divided two
types: (i) pure strategy, such as H and D in the Hawk-Dove game; (ii) mixed
9
strategy, for instance I = PH + (1 − P )D. As for the mixed strategy, the
parameter P determines the selection probability of the given pure strategy.
However, due to the impact of many factors, such as, environmental noise
and individual rationality degree, the selection probability of pure strategy is
not constant, but changes with a disturbance. Such disturbance induces the
probability P fluctuating in an interval [P−, P+]. In order to express such
uncertainty, in this paper a new strategy type, belief strategy, is proposed
based on Dempster-Shafer evidence theory. The definition of belief strategy
is given as below.
Definition of belief strategy: Let S = {s1, s2, · · · , sn} be the set of all
pure strategies in a game, a belief strategy is a mapping J from 2S to [0, 1],
formally defined by
J : 2S → [0, 1], (14)
which satisfies
J(∅) = 0 and
∑
A∈2S
J(A) = 1 (15)
If J(A) > 0, A is called a support of belief strategy J . Essentially, a belief
strategy can be expressed by one belief function. Take the Hawk-Dove game
as an example. Assume there is an individual who adopts strategy H with a
probability a and adopts strategy D with a probability b, where a, b ≥ 0 and
a+ b ≤ 1. The reminder (1− a− b) is indistinguishable so that it is assigned
to the mixture of H and D, namely {H,D}. So the individual strategy is
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indicated by 

J(H) = a,
J(D) = b,
J(H,D) = 1− a− b.
(16)
By means of the definitions of belief function and plausibility function,
shown in Eqs.(12) and (13), the lower limit and upper limit of each pure
strategy’s selection probability can be derived as:
Bel(H) = m(H) = a, P l(H) = m(H) +m(H,D) = 1− b. (17)
Bel(D) = m(D) = b, P l(D) = m(D) +m(H,D) = 1− a. (18)
According to the definitions of Bel and P l functions, the following relation
is satisfied, 
 Bel(D) = 1− P l(H),P l(D) = 1− Bel(H). (19)
Hence, in contrast with mixed strategy, the belief strategy J shown in
Eq.(16) can also represented as
J = [Bel(H), P l(H)]⊗H + [1− P l(H), 1−Bel(H)]⊗D, (20)
or
J = tH + (1− t)D, t ∈ [Bel(H), P l(H)]. (21)
Conceptually, the mixed strategy is a generalization of pure strategy, the
belief strategy is a generalization of mixed strategy. If the set of supports
of belief strategy J only consists of single pure strategy, J is reduced to a
mixed strategy.
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3.2. Belief-based ESS
Based on the above belief strategy, the belief-based ESS can been pro-
posed. Similar to the conditions of classically pure ESS and mixed ESS, a
belief strategy J can become the belief-based ESS, which is stable against
the invasion of alternative strategy T , only if
E [J, J ] > E [T, J ] , (22)
or
E [J, J ] = E [T, J ] , and E [J, T ] > E [T, T ] , (23)
for all T 6= J , E [J, T ] is the expected payoff of strategy J playing against
strategy T . The above conditions are also just suitable for infinite population,
pairwise and symmetric contests.
In order to find the belief-based ESS, it is necessary to calculate the
lower limit and upper limit of selection probability of each pure strategy,
whereat the Bishop-Canning theorem is also used. Take the Hawk-Dove
game as an example with V < C. The belief strategy is J = tH + (1− t)D,
t ∈ [Bel(H), P l(H)]. Herein we assume that t is uniformly distributed in the
interval [Bel(H), P l(H)], and its probability density function is displayed as
follows,
f(t) =


1
P l(H)−Bel(H)
, Bel(H) 6 t 6 P l(H),
0, otherwise.
(24)
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Due to H and D are the supports of J , we get,
E [H, J ] =
∫ +∞
−∞
[tE(H,H) + (1− t)E(H,D)] f(t)dt
=
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
tE(H,H) + (1− t)E(H,D)
P l(H)−Bel(H)
dt
=
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
t [E(H,H)− E(H,D)]
P l(H)− Bel(H)
dt+
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
E(H,D)
P l(H)−Bel(H)
dt
=
E(H,H)−E(H,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
·
t2
2
∣∣∣∣
P l(H)
Bel(H)
+
E(H,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
· t|
P l(H)
Bel(H)
=
E(H,H)−E(H,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
(
[P l(H)]2
2
−
[Bel(H)]2
2
)
+
E(H,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
[P l(H)−Bel(H)]
= [E(H,H)−E(H,D)]
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
+ E(H,D)
=
(
V − C
2
− V
)
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
+ V
= V −
V + C
2
·
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
.
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Similarly,
E [D, J ] =
∫ +∞
−∞
[tE(D,H) + (1− t)E(D,D)] f(t)dt
=
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
tE(D,H) + (1− t)E(D,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
dt
=
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
t [E(D,H)− E(D,D)]
P l(H)−Bel(H)
dt+
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
E(D,D)
P l(H)−Bel(H)
dt
=
E(D,H)− E(D,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
·
t2
2
∣∣∣∣
P l(H)
Bel(H)
+
E(D,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
· t|
P l(H)
Bel(H)
=
E(D,H)− E(D,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
(
[P l(H)]2
2
−
[Bel(H)]2
2
)
+
E(D,D)
P l(H)−Bel(H)
[P l(H)− Bel(H)]
= [E(D,H)− E(D,D)]
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
+ E(D,D)
=
(
0−
V
2
)
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
+
V
2
=
V
2
−
V
2
·
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
.
According to the Bishop-Canning theorem, the following condition is used
to find the belief-based ESS J :
E [H, J ] = E [D, J ] , (25)
Namely,
V −
V + C
2
·
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
=
V
2
−
V
2
·
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
,
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
=
V
C
.
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Hence, 

Bel(H) =
V
C
− δ
P l(H) =
V
C
+ δ
(26)
Formally, the belief-based ESS is shown as below.
J = tH + (1− t)D, t ∈ [
V
C
− δ,
V
C
+ δ], (27)
where 0 6 V
C
− δ 6 V
C
+ δ 6 1 and V < C. Also, the belief-based ESS J can
represented as the forms of belief function,

J(H) = V
C
− δ,
J(D) = 1− V
C
− δ,
J(H,D) = 2δ.
(28)
Figure 3 features the mixed ESS and belief-based ESS in the Hawk-Dove
game. It is explicit that in a game with two pure strategies the mixed ESS
is a point, while the belief-based ESS is a segment determined by parameter
δ geometrically. When δ = 0, the belief-based ESS is totally reduced to the
mixed ESS. The parameter δ is a measure to reflect the uncertainty of belief
strategy or belief-based ESS.
In terms of the Bishop-Canning theorem, E [H, J ] = E [D, J ] = E [J, J ].
In order to further verify the stability of J against invasion, the condition
15
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of mixed ESS and belief-based ESS
given in Eq.(23) is examined.
E [J,H] =
∫ +∞
−∞
[tE(H,H) + (1− t)E(D,H)] f(t)dt
=
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
tE(H,H) + (1− t)E(D,H)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
dt
=
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
t [E(H,H)− E(D,H)]
P l(H)−Bel(H)
dt+
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
E(D,H)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
dt
=
E(H,H)−E(D,H)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
·
t2
2
∣∣∣∣
P l(H)
Bel(H)
+
E(D,H)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
· t|
P l(H)
Bel(H)
=
E(H,H)−E(D,H)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
(
[P l(H)]2
2
−
[Bel(H)]2
2
)
+
E(D,H)
P l(H)−Bel(H)
[P l(H)− Bel(H)]
= [E(H,H)−E(D,H)]
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
+ E(D,H)
=
(
V − C
2
− 0
)
(V/C + δ) + (V/C − δ)
2
+ 0
=
V − C
2
·
V
C
,
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E [J,D] =
∫ +∞
−∞
[tE(H,D) + (1− t)E(D,D)] f(t)dt
=
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
tE(H,D) + (1− t)E(D,D)
P l(H)−Bel(H)
dt
=
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
t [E(H,D)−E(D,D)]
P l(H)− Bel(H)
dt+
∫
P l(H)
Bel(H)
E(D,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
dt
=
E(H,D)− E(D,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
·
t2
2
∣∣∣∣
P l(H)
Bel(H)
+
E(D,D)
P l(H)−Bel(H)
· t|P l(H)
Bel(H)
=
E(H,D)− E(D,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
(
[P l(H)]2
2
−
[Bel(H)]2
2
)
+
E(D,D)
P l(H)− Bel(H)
[P l(H)−Bel(H)]
= [E(H,D)− E(D,D)]
P l(H) +Bel(H)
2
+ E(D,D)
=
(
V −
V
2
)
·
(V/C + δ) + (V/C − δ)
2
+
V
2
=
V
2
·
V
C
+
V
2
,
E [H,H ] =
V − C
2
, and E [D,D] =
V
2
.
It can be found E [J,H] > E [H,H], and E [J,D] > E [D,D], when V < C.
Hence, these formulas prove that the belief-based ESS J is stable against
invasion.
4. Conclusions
In short, we have reviewed the concept of ESS and the uncertainty in-
volved in the mixed strategy. This uncertainty mainly comes from the distur-
bance of the selection probability of pure strategies. In order to reflect such
17
uncertainty, a belief strategy has been proposed based on Dempster-Shafer
evidence theory. The proposed belief strategy is a generalization of mixed
strategy. If the set of supports of a belief strategy only consists of single pure
strategy, the belief strategy can reduce to a mixed strategy. What’s more,
on the basis of the belief strategy, a belief-based ESS is proposed, which,
to large extent, extends the mixed ESS. The proposed belief strategy and
belief-based ESS can provide more powerful tools to describe complicated
interaction among agents.
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